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INTRODUCTION
European Union (“EU”) Directive 2003/87/EC establishes a
scheme for greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emission allowance trading
(“EU ETS”) within the European Community (“EC”). Under
Article 25(1) of this directive, the European Commission has a
mandate to negotiate and conclude agreements with third coun-
tries establishing a link to national or regional GHG emissions
trading schemes.1 Aside from increased market liquidity and, by
consequence, reduced compliance costs, such a link promises to
lessen competitive distortions between the participating states,
counteract the threat of leakage, and potentially improve the
prospects for a truly global carbon market.2 With various
regional trading schemes currently under development in the
United States,3 the concept of linking emissions-trading markets
attracts attention on both sides of the Atlantic. Accordingly, the
European Council of Environment Ministers, which essen-
tially decides on the adoption
of environmental legislation in
the EU, recently expressed “its
commitment to developing a
strong global carbon market by
linking the EU ETS with other
emissions trading schemes at
national or regional level.”4
Meanwhile, an Executive Order
adopted by the Governor of Cal-
ifornia explicitly calls for the
development of a “program that
permits trading with the Euro-
pean Union (. . .) and other juris-
dictions.”5
Indeed, the subject of linkages between GHG emissions
trading has become a widely discussed issue in climate negotia-
tions and among climate experts. In his review of the economic
costs of climate change, for instance, the acclaimed economist
Sir Nicholas Stern considered linking national, regional, and
sectoral carbon markets as an international priority and a valu-
able opportunity to define a global price for carbon.6 Unsurpris-
ingly, several studies have addressed this issue by outlining
conceptual issues and assessing the mutual compatibility of trad-
ing schemes,7 although few have specifically addressed the legal
challenges raised by such a market link. As a survey of existing
scholarship reveals, a great majority of the conceptual chal-
lenges identified thus far are largely political in nature and rarely
involve legal considerations. While essential for the operation of
a trading link, for instance, the mutual recognition of allowances
has been ultimately declared a “political issue,” and monitoring,
reporting, and verification requirements mainly considered vital
for their effect on confidence in the market.8 In the end, rela-
tively few design elements need to be compatible for a link to
become legally viable,9 with a high degree of harmonization
between connected markets arguably desirable for political and
economic reasons, but not essential as a matter of law.
When considering a market link between emissions trading
schemes, questions of law are likely to emerge in two respects:
first, during the process of implementation, which invariably
necessitates recourse to recognized sources of law and legal pro-
cedures, and, second, during actual operation of the market link,
where the latter may conflict with substantive norms and princi-
ples of international, regional, or domestic law. Questions per-
taining to the operation of a future trading link cannot be
addressed in a comprehensive
manner at this stage, given the
current uncertainties about its
ultimate design.10 Drawing on
the example of a link between
the current market in the EU and
evolving markets in different
regions of the United States, this
article will provide an overview
of legal challenges apparent in
the preparatory process, focus-
ing on the legal nature of a link-
ing arrangement and the
procedural constraints imposed
on its adoption. 
LEGAL NATURE OF A LINKING AGREEMENT
As one scholar succinctly described it, “[t]wo national emis-
sions trading schemes are linked if one country’s allowance can
be used, directly or indirectly, by a participant in the other coun-
try’s scheme for compliance purposes.”11 In other words, sepa-
rate trading schemes can be considered linked if allowances can
flow between the respective schemes. As a result of such a link
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between trading programs in the United States and the EU, for
instance, participants in the North American market could buy
allowances in the EU ETS for compliance with their domestic
reduction targets, and vice versa. However, a trading link does
not necessarily have to operate in both directions. Rather, one
jurisdiction may choose to create a unilateral link to other mar-
kets, especially if the latter allow any legal or natural person to
own allowances with the option of having these retired or can-
celled. To this end, the jurisdiction in question could simply
decide to recognize allowances purchased and cancelled in a for-
eign trading scheme for compliance purposes at home.12
Although a trading link could also be construed to encompass
the transfer of credits through an overarching framework, such
as the Clean Development Mechanism (“CDM”) set out under
the Kyoto Protocol,13 this article will disregard such indirect
approaches to focus on arrangements suitable for the establish-
ment of a direct bridge between the EU ETS and regional trading
schemes in the United States.
While a unilateral link between trading schemes can be
established through a simple legislative amendment specifying
the conditions for recognition of foreign allowances, a bi- or
multilateral link will typically require negotiations between the
legislators of all affected trading
schemes, resulting in some form
of mutual understanding. Con-
ventionally, this understanding
could be reached by way of: (1)
a purely political arrangement;
(2) a binding international
treaty; or (3) mutual recognition
of allowances by way of recipro-
cal rules in the domestic law 
of participating jurisdictions.
Another approach could involve
transboundary contracts entered
individually or collectively under private law, although this
option is unlikely to offer the certainty and political acceptance
needed for a comprehensive market link.
POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS
A political solution based on informal consultations has the
benefit of obviating lengthy negotiation and ratification proce-
dures. Aside from mere declarations of intent, for instance
through joint statements at political summits, a more formal way
of documenting a convergence of will can lie in the conclusion
of a Memorandum of Understanding, documenting a desired
line of action, but lacking the binding power of a legal commit-
ment. Adding to the less cumbersome procedure, such informal
arrangements are also easier to modify and adapt than binding
treaties. However, given the economic ramifications of a trading
link and the importance of certainty and transparence for smooth
market operation, pressure from stakeholders in the market will
likely prompt legislators to opt for a more reliable, legally bind-
ing solution. 
BINDING INTERNATIONAL TREATIES
Article 25(1) of Directive 2003/87/EC has chosen to follow
this latter path by referring to the procedure in Article 300 of the
Treaty Establishing the European Community (“EC Treaty”),14
which specifies the adoption of international treaties by the
European Community. A treaty is one of the recognized sources
of international law.15 Its binding force follows from the custom-
ary maxim of pacta sunt servanda,16 which ultimately reflects
state sovereignty limited through voluntary consent.17 The viola-
tion of duties under a treaty counts as a breach of international
law, incurring state responsibility and the possibility of sanc-
tions, often defined in the treaty itself as part of a negotiated
compliance mechanism. While offering a high degree of cer-
tainty, the adoption of an international treaty entails a lengthy
and often contentious ratification process. Likewise, subsequent
amendments to the treaty or a withdrawal from it are again sub-
ject to sophisticated rules of international law.18 Nonetheless,
due to the formal nature and the transparency they offer, interna-
tional treaties are likely to be the instrument of choice for a
future linking agreement. Still, it bears restating that such
treaties can only be concluded by formal subjects of interna-
tional law, a limitation of major
relevance for any transatlantic
linking agreement between
regional trading markets.
RECIPROCAL
COMMITMENTS
Rather than approving an
international arrangement with
binding force, different trading
markets could also enter a polit-
ical commitment to adopt recip-
rocal legislation within their
respective jurisdictions, thereby
ensuring the mutual recognition of emission allowances. Such an
arrangement would ultimately entail an adaptation of the respec-
tive registry systems and thus derive its authority from domestic
law, although it would result from formal or informal negotia-
tions and preparatory meetings between states. Relative to an
international treaty, of course, such a construction would not
have the capacity to bind participating jurisdictions, allowing for
unilateral amendment or termination of the trading link without
prior consent of other parties. In certain situations, this aggre-
gate solution might be the only available means to connect sepa-
rate markets while offering the legal certainty and transparency
of formal law. In that instance, unilateral digression is unlikely
for as long as participants retain the common interest in an oper-
ational trading link.
CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS
A final vehicle for the implementation of a linking arrange-
ment is private law, that is, the law governing the mutual rela-
tions between natural and legal persons, notably the law of
contracts and torts as it is called in the common law, or the law of
obligations as it is called in civil legal systems. Different
The concept of linking
emissions-trading markets
attracts attention on both
sides of the Atlantic.
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approaches are conceivable under private law, although these
will all involve some form of contract, either to establish a
longer contractual relationship or purely negotiated in casu to
govern individual transactions. Whether a formal link has been
created or not, transactions leading to a transfer of allowances
will generally involve a contract specifying the terms of a partic-
ular transaction, such as the price and volume of allowances, the
delivery date, a force majeure clause, and default or liability pro-
visions.19 Even in the absence of a formal link, market partici-
pants could use private law to create a bridge between otherwise
separate trading systems by establishing a system for the conver-
sion of permits. An example of this would be a system of private
brokers leveraging arbitration opportunities. Such arrangements
are legally viable due to the fact that many trading schemes,
including the ETS, impose no restrictions on account ownership,
allowing virtually anyone to open an account an thereby enter
the market. Moreover, there is a vital difference between trade in
allowances, which is theoretically open to everyone, and actual
transfer, which is usually limited to market participants.20 In the
voluntary sector, private transactions across trading schemes
have already occurred.21
Unlike public international
law and the rules adopted by the
EC, private law is not a body of
norms adopted across national
frontiers. Instead, it differs from
state to state, often with vast dif-
ferences between historically
separate regulatory traditions
such as the common law, which
is based largely on judicial
precedent, and civil law, which
is based largely on codif ied
rules. Of course, the United
Nations Convention on Con-
tracts for the International Sale of Goods22 has gone some way to
establish a uniform law of sales, but its application to emissions
allowances — the legal nature of which, while not entirely clear,
rules out classification as a good or service23 — is questionable.24
In the absence of a harmonized normative framework, the
contractual arrangements for a trading link will thus be governed
either by the private law of a particular state as specified in the
contract, the most likely case, or by the private law of the state
determined by way of international private law. This latter set of
rules, also known as conflict of laws, merely helps regulate
transboundary relations between private law subjects by deter-
mining which of the competing legal systems is applicable. The
choice of law in contractual relationships is typically selected
based upon either the place where the transaction physically
occurred (lex loci actus) or the doctrine of the proper law, which
is the law with the closest connection to the facts of the case.
Altogether, this allows for great flexibility in the development of
a trading link based on private law, although the scope of appli-
cation will tend to remain limited to individual transactions or
trading on a smaller scale. As mentioned earlier, market partici-
pants are likely to insist on a transparent, legally binding frame-
work for transactions between their respective trading schemes,
favoring the predictability of formal legislation over a contrac-
tual solution based on private law.
PROCEDURAL CONSIDERATIONS OF A
LINKING ARRANGEMENT
As stated in the preceding section, the use of different link-
ing arrangements can trigger differing formal procedures. While
a political solution and contractual arrangements will generally
pose no major challenges in this regard, both international
treaties and domestic legislation mandating the mutual recogni-
tion of foreign allowances may only be adopted in accordance
with sophisticated provisions of legislative procedures and the
institutional distribution of powers. With a view to the express
reference contained in Article 25(1) of Directive 2003/87/EC,
this section will begin with an assessment of the procedural
framework for international agreements linking the EU ETS
with other emissions trading schemes. 
PROCEDURAL ISSUES UNDER EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY LAW
First and foremost, the
mandate set out in Article 25(1)
of Directive 2003/87/EC limits
participation in a linking agree-
ment to “third countries listed in
Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol
which have ratified the Proto-
col,” a limitation which, for the
time being, precludes an inter-
national treaty with the United
States because it has withdrawn
from the Protocol. Thus, the 
usefulness of the Directive in
guiding a transatlantic linking
arrangement is limited and the foregoing restriction will have to
be repealed by way of a legislative amendment. A review process
that may result in an amendment is scheduled to conclude by
June 2007. In this connection, the European Commission
recently indicated its intention to link with trading schemes cur-
rently under development in the United States.25
Although a transatlantic market link based on Article 25(1)
of Directive 2003/87/EC may be ruled out for now, the proce-
dure mandated therein may still serve as a likely model for
future arrangements. Given that Directive 2003/87/EC is only
derived legislation, without prejudice to the powers conferred on
the EC under its constitutive treaty, it is conceivable that the
Council would move forward without observing the constraints
imposed by the foregoing mandate. Article 25(1) does not even
specify the legislative procedure itself, but instead refers to Arti-
cle 300 of the EC Treaty, a general provision setting out the
process for adoption of international agreements with third
states or international organizations. A sophisticated procedure,
Article 300 involves several stages and participation by the
European Commission, the Council, and the Parliament. 
A trading link to the 
EU ETS would not 
violate the Commerce
Clause of the U.S.
Constitution.
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Essentially, the Commission is charged with negotiating
international agreements, while the Council approves their sub-
sequent adoption. Before opening negotiations, the Commission
requires authorization by the Council to conduct negotiations on
behalf of the EC, usually through a Council decision based on a
draft by the Commission which occasionally sets out confiden-
tial negotiating guidelines. Upon approval of an agreed text, the
Commission proposes a decision on its conclusion by the Coun-
cil, which may sign or reject the agreement.26 As in the domestic
sphere, ratification is a separate act, again occurring though a
decision adopted subsequently by the Council on the initiative of
the Commission.
Directive 2003/87/EC was adopted on the basis of Article
175(1) and in application of the procedure set out in Article 251
of the EC Treaty, which merely requires a qualified majority in
the Council. Pursuant to Article 300(2) of the EC Treaty, a link-
ing agreement may likewise be adopted with a qualified major-
ity. It is uncertain whether the European Parliament will merely
need to be consulted or has the capacity to reject a trading link,
given that the respective agreement might be understood as
“establishing a specific institutional framework by organi[z]ing
cooperation procedures.” Requiring approval — rather than a
mere opinion — by the European Parliament could have signifi-
cant implications for the prospects of a linking agreement,
because the Parliament has traditionally been more reserved
than the Commission and the Council in deploying market
instruments. 
On a more general level, it merits noting that the EC is
unique in that Member States delegate a significant part of their
treaty negotiation powers to the Community level. Reflecting the
legal and political realities of the EC as a supranational entity
composed of sovereign states, treaty practice has become
increasingly dominated by “mixed agreements,” that is, agree-
ments to which both the EC and its Member States are party as a
result of shared competences.27 In accordance with the doctrines
of attributed powers and the parallelism between internal and
external competences, the adoption of a linking agreement pur-
suant to Article 300 of the EC Treaty will require consideration
of its subject matter to determine the allocation of powers
between the Community and the Member States. 
In the case of environmental agreements, the Community
derives its competence from Article 175(1) of the EC Treaty,
which sets out a general mandate for action on environmental
protection. It holds this power concurrently with the Member
States, which retain authority to regulate the environment until
the EC has acted. Additionally, the Treaty allows Member States
to adopt more stringent environmental measures under Article
176, and generally leaves the enforcement of EC law to their
domestic authorities. 
When the EC adopts common rules internally to regulate an
environmental issue, Member States are generally precluded
from entering into international agreements that affect such
rules or alter their scope.28 Article 176 of the EC Treaty allows
Member States to introduce more stringent measures,29 however,
and Article 174(4) clarifies that:
Within their respective spheres of competence, the
Community and the Member States shall cooperate
with third countries and with the competent interna-
tional organisations. The arrangements for Community
cooperation may be the subject of agreements between
the Community and the third parties concerned, which
shall be negotiated and concluded in accordance with
Article 300. 
The previous subparagraph shall be without prejudice
to Member States’ competence to negotiate in interna-
tional bodies and to conclude international agreements.
Ultimately, clarifying the division of competences within
the EC is a difficult task, with boundaries constantly evolving.30
Depending on their substance and the competencies touched
upon, environmental agreements entered into by the EC may —
but do not have to — be adopted as mixed agreements.31 In
effect, it may be in the interest of both the Community and its
Member States, and possibly also of third states, to opt for an
agreement concluded by the Community only, notably to speed
up the adoption process. At the same time, where competence
for the subject matter of an agreement is shared between the
Community and the Member States, actual implementation will
usually require the participation of both. Past experience shows
the Member States insisting upon mixity even in instances when
it is not required by law.32
In fact, it is perhaps no coincidence that nearly all treaties
on environmental protection have been concluded as mixed
agreements,33 including the Framework Convention on Climate
Change and the Kyoto Protocol. With Directive 2003/87/EC
leaving ample discretion to the Member States in its implemen-
tation, there is a certain probability that the latter would insist on
active participation in the negotiations preceding a linking
agreement, prompting recourse to a mixed agreement as the
most suitable instrument. Legal challenges can arise as a result,
specifically regarding the allocation of responsibilities under the
agreement between the Community and the Member States.
Unless their respective duties are separately specified, both the
Community and the Member States will be responsible for
observance of all commitments entered under the agreement.
Likewise, if only part of the Member States chooses to ratify a
mixed agreement alongside the Community, the entirety of
Member States will nonetheless be bound by its provisions, a
departure from the usual notion that each party is only responsi-
ble for the performance of its own obligations.34 Altogether, this
adds to the complexity of a linking agreement, and it is more
than questionable whether the vehicle of choice should be an
international treaty concluded simultaneously by the Commu-
nity and its Member States.
PROCEDURAL ISSUES UNDER UNITED STATES LAW
In the United States, federalism can raise similar concerns
with regard to the admissibility of a regional linking agreement
between individual states, or groups of states, and the EU ETS.
Described by a commentator as altogether “terse” in this
regard,35 the U.S. Constitution contains only four articles per-
taining to treaty powers. Of these, Article I is the most relevant
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for a potential market link, given that its Section 10 prohibits any
state from entering into a “treaty, alliance, or confederation” or
from entering “without the Consent of Congress. . . into any
Agreement or Compact. . . with a foreign Power.”36 In essence,
this provision denies States international legal personality, limit-
ing their ability to participate in diplomatic relations and alto-
gether barring them from the conclusion of an international
treaty.37 Regarding international treaties, the scope of this
restriction is wide, covering all binding international arrange-
ments “regardless of title, designation, or form.”38 Clearly, then,
the States could not enter into a linking agreement with the
European Community under the terms set out by Article 25(1) of
Directive 2003/87/EC if such an arrangement were to be
designed as a formal treaty. 
While U.S. States may be precluded from entering into a
treaty with the EC, they are empowered to adopt a binding
“compact” or “agreement” with the consent of Congress, result-
ing in the question of how these differ from formal treaties.
However, to date no agreement between a State and foreign
power has been successfully
challenged due to the lack of
authority of the State.39 There-
fore, there appears to exist a
potential avenue for a link
between regional trading
schemes in the United States
and the EU ETS. 
Article I, Section 10 of the
U.S. Constitution makes the
conclusion of such an agreement
conditional on approval by Con-
gress. However, even in the
absence  of  Cong ress iona l
endorsement, individual States
may, under certain circum-
stances, enter into an agreement
with foreign powers.40 As the
United States Supreme Court has notably declared, a compact
with a foreign power requires Congressional approval only if it
tends “to the increase of political power in the States which may
encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United
States.”41 Consent to an agreement is thus only required if the
agreement tends to give the state elements of international sover-
eignty, interferes with the full and free exercise of federal
authority, or deals locally with a matter on which there is or
might be national policy.42 As the Restatement Third of the For-
eign Relations Law of the United States comments, “agreements
involving local transborder issues, such as agreements to curb a
source of pollution. . . have been considered not to require Con-
gressional consent.”43 Accordingly, it appears possible, albeit not
certain, that a linking agreement could be adopted without fed-
eral endorsement by way of a state compact or agreement. Still,
Congress can always supersede such state arrangements by leg-
islation.
Should the preceding options prove unfeasible, U.S. States
can always resort to amending their internal legislation with a
view to including rules on the mutual recognition of foreign
allowances. Because neither party is legally bound to maintain
its law, reciprocal legislation adopted concurrently by two or
more jurisdictions does not constitute a treaty, nor an agreement
requiring Congressional consent.44 Affording means of circum-
navigating the constraints of international and constitutional law,
such reciprocal recognition could be based on an informal
understanding setting out the substantive provisions required to
create an operational trading link. Any institutional responsibili-
ties could be assigned to a private body established and funded
by the respective participants, obviating the need for recourse to
international law. Operating through a Memorandum of Under-
standing at the preparatory stage, the Northeastern States partic-
ipating in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (“RGGI”)
have already evidenced the feasibility of an informal arrange-
ment to decide certain features of their future trading scheme.
More importantly, States have concluded past reciprocal
arrangements with foreign powers also to overcome procedural
constraints.45 Likewise, the EC
has in the past resorted to infor-
mal understandings as a vehicle
for the settlement of contentious
transatlantic issues.46 Accord-
ingly, States could amend the
legislation implementing their
regional trading scheme, while
the EC could adopt a directive
amending Directive 2003/87/ EC.
In all foregoing cases, a
transatlantic market link would
not appear to contravene the
supremacy of federal law
because, to date, the federal
government has not adopted leg-
islation precluding state law in
the area of GHG emissions trad-
ing. Likewise, a trading link to the EU ETS would not violate the
Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Contained in Article
I, Section eight, Clause three, the Commerce Clause empowers
Congress to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States.” 
As the concept of commerce can also be applied to environ-
mental markets,47 the Commerce Clause has raised doubts about
the legality of RGGI provisions constraining energy imports
from outside in order to prevent leakages.48 As long as the
United States fails to regulate international trade in GHGs, how-
ever, this clause will remain dormant and merely prohibit states
from passing legislation that improperly burdens transboundary
commerce. Regarding the latter, the U.S. Constitution does “not
prohibit every state law or regulation that has some effect on
interstate or foreign commerce.”49 The Supreme Court has sum-
marized the applicable jurisprudence as follows:
Where the Statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate
a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on
The European
Commission recently
indicated its intention to
link with trading schemes
currently under
development in the 
United States.
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interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be
upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is
clearly excessive in relation to the putative local bene-
fit. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the ques-
tion becomes one of degree. And the extent of the
burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on
the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether
it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on
interstate activities.50 
The creation of a market link facilitates commerce. But
even if a linking arrangement were, in any way, to be considered
burdensome on domestic or international commerce, it appears
likely that its environmental and economic benefits could out-
weigh such effects under the foregoing proportionality assess-
ment. 
CONCLUSION
The goal of this article was to examine the possible legal
ramifications resulting from a linking arrangement between
regional trading schemes in Europe and the United States. While
many legal issues have yet to emerge as such a link begins to
operate in practice, this initial analysis allows for an important
conclusion: even on the austere level of constitutional doctrines
and legislative procedures, a range of legal options is available
for the implementation of a future trading link. Arising obstacles
may be avoided through careful selection of the legal instrument
embodying the market link. Admittedly, some issues will prove
challenging to resolve, such as the creation of a global market
involving various participants, of which only some are party to
an overarching regime based on a common currency. Even in
such a situation, conceptual solutions have already been pro-
posed to bridge regime boundaries, such as the creation of a
clearinghouse or gateway facilitating the transfer of otherwise
incompatible units.51
As they have evolved to date, carbon markets have proven to
be complex entities, embedded in sophisticated networks of con-
tingent interests, traditionally diverse approaches to governance,
and distinct regulatory constraints. Reconciling the inevitable
differences between two or more trading schemes is not solely a
task for lawyers or the law, but a matter of bringing together
divergent preferences and expectations. In essence, the estab-
lishment of a link between different trading schemes will mainly
call for political deliberation, mutual concession, and, to some
extent, the willingness to tolerate remaining differences. For
lawyers, the challenge will be to translate the negotiated consen-
sus into legally viable arrangements, observing applicable rules
of domestic, regional and international law. The rest remains a
matter of political agreement. One might argue with another
scholar that, wherever an economic incentive exists to bridge
different systems, “money will cross the divide.”52 And in the
end, Stuart Eizenstat, who helped negotiate the Kyoto Protocol
on behalf of the United States, may have stated it best by observ-
ing: “The market is pulling the law along.”53
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